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FORENSIC SCIENCE 
EXPERT QUALIFICATIONS: TRAPS FOR THE 
UNWARY 
Paul C. Giannelli* 
Introduction 
The importance of expert testimony in criminal practice cannot be 
overstated. One study reported: ''About one quarter of the citizens who had 
served on juries which were presented with scientific evidence believed that 
had such evidence been absent, they would have changed their verdicts­
from guilty to not guilty.' '1 Of coirrse, the quality of the expert testimony 
received at trial depends almost entirely on the quality of the witnesses who 
testify as experts. This article examines some of the pitfalls associated with 
the qualifications of expert witnesses. 
Federal Rule 702 
Federal Evidence Rule 702 provides that a witness may qualify as an 
expert by reason of ''lmowledge, skill, experience, training, or education.' '2 
Rule 104(a) entrusts the trial judge with determining the qualifications of 
experts3 and that decision is reviewable only for an abuse of discretion.4 
Dean Wigmore wrote that the witness's expertise "may have been attained, 
so far as legal rules go, in any way whatever; all the law requires is that it 
*Albert J. Weatherhead III & Richard W. Weatherhead Professor of Law, Case 
Western Reserve University. This article is based in part on P. Giannelli & E. Im­
winkelried, Scientific Evidence (3d ed._1999). Reprinted with permission. 
1 Peterson, Ryan, Boulden & Mihajlovic, "The Use and Effects of Forensic Sci­
ence in the Adjudication of Felony Cases," 32 J. Forensic Sci. 1730, 1748 (1987). 
2 Fed. R. Evid. 702: "If scientific, teclmical, or other specialized knowledge will 
assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue, a 
witness qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or educa­
tion, may testify thereto in the form· of an opinion or otherwise.'' 
3 Fed. R. Evid. 1 04(a): ''Preliminary questions concerning the qualification of a 
person to be a witness . . . shall be determined by the court . . . . '' 
4 See Hamling v. United States, 418 U.S. 87, 108 (1974) ("[T]he District Court 
has wide discretion in its determination to admit and exclude evidence, and this is 
particularly true in the case of expert testimony. " ); Salem v. United States
' 
Lines 
Co., 370 U.S. 31, 35 (1962) ("The trial judge has broad discretion in the matter of 
the admission or exclusion of expert evidence, and his action is to be sustained un­
less manifestly enoneous.' '). 
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should have been attained.' '5 The federal drafters expressed it this way: 
'' [T]he expert is viewed, not in a narrow sense, but as a person qualified by 
'lmowledge, skill, experience, training or education.' Thus within the scope 
of the mle are not only experts in the strictest sense of the word, e.g. physi­
cians, physicists, and architects, but also the large group sometimes called 
'skilled' witnesses, such as bankers or landowners testifying to land values.' '6 
A number of basic points are not in dispute. First, because ''the rule uses 
the disjunctive, a person may qualify to render expert testimony in any one 
of the five ways listed: lmowledge, skill, experience, training, or education.' '7 
In other words, the '' [ q]ualifications which may satisfy the requirements of 
Evid. R. 702 are multitudinous .. . . [T]here is no 'degree' requirement, per 
se. Professional experience and traitling in a particular field may be sufficient 
to qualify one as an expert.' '8 
Second, an expert need not be an ''outstanding practitioner in the field in 
which he professes expertise. "9 Indeed, an "expe1i need not have certifi­
cates of training, nor memberships in professional organizations . . . . ''10 
Third, comparable qualifications between experts testifying on the same 
issue are not required: "[O]ne expert need not hold the exact same set of 
qualifications to rebut another expert's testimony. . . . Thjs Cm.ui need not 
analyze, as Defendant contends it should, whether a psychologist or psyct.ti­
atrist is more qualified to testify as to the psychological condition of a patient 
at the tin1e of the offense.' 'll If a battle of the experts develops, '' [ c ]om pari­
sons between [an expert's] professional stature and the stah1re of witnesses 
for an opposing party may be made by the jury . . . . But the only question 
for the trial judge who must decide whether or not to allow the jury to 
consider a proffered expert's opinions is, 'whether his lmowledge of the 
subject matter is such that his opinion will most likely assist the trier of fact 
in arriving at the truth.''' 12 
Fourth, an expert's qualifications should be based on the nature and 
extent of the witness's lmowledge and not on the witness's "title." In Jen­
ldns v. United States13 the D.C. Circuit reversed a trial court's ruling that 
psychologists were not qualified to testify on the issue of i.Ttsanity because 
they lacked medical training. '' [W]e must examine the reality behind the 
52 J. Wigmore, Evidence § 556, at 75 1 (Chadbourn rev. 1979). 
6 Fed. R. Evid. 702 advisory committee's note. 
7 Kopf v. Skyrm, 993 F.2d 374, 377 (4th Cir. 1993). 
8 State v. Mack, 653 N.E.2d 329, 337 (Ohio 1995), ce1i. denied, 516 U.S. 1096 
( 1996). 
9 United States v. Barker, 553 F.2d 10 13, 1024 (6th Cir. 1977) . 
Jo Id. 
11 United States v. Madoch, 935 F. Supp. 965, 972 (N.D. Ill. 1996). 
12 United States v. Barker, 553 F.2d 10 13, 1024 (6th Cir. 1977). 
13 307 F.2d 637, 644 (D.C. Cir. 1962). 
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title 'psychologist.' ' '  On one hand, many psychologists would not be quali­
fied to express an opinion on insanity because their ''traiillng and experience 
may not provide an adequate basis for their testimony. ' '  14 On the other hand, 
other psychologists, because of their training and experience in the diagnosis 
and treatment of mental disorders, may be qualified.15 
Criminals as Experts 
An interesting example of experience as a qualification for expert 
testimony involves the use of criminals. For example, in United States v. 
Johnson16 an experienced marijuana smoker was permitted to testify that 
certain marijuana came from Colombia; the witness ''had smoked marijuana 
over a thousand times . . . .  He based his identification upon the plant 's ap­
pearance, its leaf, buds, stems, and other physical characteristics, as well as 
upon the smell and the effect of smoking it. ' '17 In United States v. Williams18 
the witness testified about a street gang 's drug code.19 The court wrote: 
"There was no pretense that he was impartial, or a member of a learned 
profession. Neither condition is required to qualify a person as an expert wit­
ness under the current rules of evidence . . . . There is-'not even a paradox 
in the suggestion that the biggest experts on crime are, often, criminals. ' '20 
Declaring a Witness an Expert 
In contrast to existing practice, the Kentucky Supreme Court has taken 
the position that the trial judge should not declare the witness an expert in 
the presence of the jury. In Luttrell v. Commonwealth21 the court stated: 
''Great care should be exercised by a trial judge when the determination has 
been made that the witness is an expert. If the jury is so informed such a 
conclusion obviously enhances the credibility of that witness in the eyes of 
the jury. All such rulings should be made outside the hearing of the jury and 
there should be no declaration that the witness is an expert. ' '22 
Stipulations 
Frequently, opposing counsel offers to stipulate to the qualifications of 
14 ld. 
15 Id. 
16 575 F.2d 1347 (5th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 907 (1979). 
17 Id. at 1360. 
18 81 F.3d 1434 (7th Cir. 1996), cert. denied, 522 U.S. 1062 (1998). 
19 Id. at 1442 ("You don't have to be a scientist or use the methodology of sci­
ence, or even be an honest, decent, law-abiding citizen, in order to possess special­
ized 1m ow ledge about a criminal activity.''). 
20 Id. at 1441. 
21 952 S.W.2d 216 (Ky. 1997). 
22 ld. at 218. 
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an expert These offers are often rejected because the stipulation deprives the 
jury of information that makes the expert's opinion more persuasive. In 
State v. Colwell23 the trial court required the defense counsel to accept the 
prosecution's offer to stipulate to the qualifications of the defense patholo­
gist. Consequently, the jury was deprived of learning the credentials of the 
expert, who had a "national reputation" in the :field of forensic pathology. In 
contrast, eleven pages of the transcript \Vere needed to record the qualifica­
tions of the prosecution's expert. The Kansas Supreme Court reversed: ''We 
conclude that an offer by the State to stipulate to the qualifications of an 
expert witness called by the defendant is merely an offer unless accepted by 
the defendant. Absent such acceptance, the defendant has the right to present 
the witness' qualifications to the jury.' '24 
Although some professions require licensing by the state, licensing in a 
:field is usually not detenninative in qualifying a witness as an expert-but 
this may be changing. In People v. Wesf5 an Illinois appellate corui held that 
a witness not licensed to investigate fires lli.J.der a state statute was not quali­
fied to testifY about the cause of a fire in a..n arson prosecution. Si...-·nilarly, i..1 
Soliz v. State2r. a Texas appellate court mled a police officer unqualified as an 
hypnotist under a statute that prohibited hypnotic interviews by the police 
unless the officer had completed a training course approved by a state com­
mission and passed an examination designed to test the officer's lmowledge 
of investigative hypnosis. 
Certification by a professional peer group may also be a trend in the 
future.27 There are a number of forensic science organizations that certifY its 
members, and this is an important development. It is not, however, without 
problems. One of the factors cited by the United States Supreme Court in its 
"junk science" case, Daubert v. lvferrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc.,28 was 
the ''existence and maintenance of standards'' in a field. The Daubert Comi 
cited United States v. Williams,29 a voiceprint case, on this point. In Williams 
the Second Circuit cited the certification procedures of the 1J.temational As-
23 790 P.2d 430 (Kan. 1990). 
2.1 Id. at 434. 
25 636 N.E.2d 1239, 1245 ( Ill. App 1994). 
26 961 S.W.2d 545, 549 (Tex. App. 1997) (citing Tex. Gov't Code Ann. 
§ 415.036(a) (Vernon 1990)). 
27 See questioned documents cases at notes 52-54 and accompanying texts. 
28 509 U.S. 579 (1993). 
29 583 F.2d 1194, 1198 (2d CiT. 1978), ceri. denied, 439 U.S. 1117 (1979). 
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sociation ofVoice Identification.30 The problem with the Supreme Court 's 
citation of Williams is that a National Academy of Sciences report on 
voiceprints concluded that this was not a scientific group; this Association 
"as presently constituted does not possess the broad base of representation 
usually considered appropriate and perhaps essential for a national certifYing 
board. ' '3 1 This group was composed of law enforcement officers who were 
trained to do voice identifications. Only one person in the group, Dr. Tosi, 
who conducted the initial voiceprint experiments at Michigan State 
University, was a scientist. 
· 
Moreover, the certification procedures should be scrutinized. For 
example, an article in The Wall Street Journal, entitled "The Making of an 
Expert Witness: It's in the Credentials," discusses the American College of 
Forensic Examiners (ACFE), which makes $2.2 ?lillian a year certifying 
experts.32 The roots of this organization, accordiii.g to its founder, can be 
traced to the Daubert decision, which (paradoxically) was intended to tighten 
the standards for expert testimony. This organization appears to be a 
"certification" mill. It cost $350 to get certified-just diall-800-4A-Expert. 
Professor Carol Henderson applied the term "checkbo,ok credentials" to 
this type of certification procedure. 33 Nevertheless, the '' ACFE is the biggest 
credentialing body in forensic science and the only one that credentials 
experts in many specialties. It has 13,000 members and nearly 17,000 board­
certified diplomates.' '34 
Brewer v. State,S5 a bite-mark case, raised a different issue. In that case, 
the defense challenged the qualifications of Dr. Michael West because he 
had been suspended by the American Board of Forensic Odontology and had 
resigned from the International Association of Identification and the Ameri­
can Academy of Forensic Sciences while under investigation. The court 
rejected the challenge, pointing out that West 's "fiasco" in a prior case 
involved his ''blue light ' '  technique, through which he claimed to be able to 
perfectly match a bruise on an accused 's palm with the murder weapon. 36 
Moreover, West had testified in seven cases after his suspension, and the 
defense expert conceded that West was qualified and that his direct 
comparison technique was an acceptable method.37 
30 See Giannelli, "Daubert: Interpreting the Federal Rules of Evidence," 15 Car­
dozo L. Rev. 1999 (1994). 
3 1  National Research Council, On the Theory and Practice of Voice Identification 
65 (1979). 
32 MacDonald, "The Making of an Expert Witness: It's in the Credentials," Wall 
StreetJ., Feb. 8, 1999, at Bl. 
33 Hansen, ''Expertise to Go,'' 86 ABA J. 44, 45 (Feb. 2000). 
34 Id. at 46. 
35 725 So. 2d 106 (Miss. 1998), cert. denied, 119 S. Ct. 1270 (1999). 
36 See Giannelli, ''The Abuse of Scientific Evidence in Criminal Cases: The 
Need for Independent Crime Laboratories," 4 Va. J. L. & Soc. Policy 439, 454-55 
(1997) (discussing the blue-light technique). 
37 725 So. 2d at 125-26. 
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In a surprising number of cases experts have lied about their credentials. 38 
For example, in one case a serologist testified that he had a master's degree 
in science, ''whereas in fact he never attained a graduate degree.' '39 In an­
other case the death penalty was vacated when it was discovered that a pros­
ecution expert, who ''had testified in many cases,'' had lied about her profes­
sional qualifications: ''she had never fulfil ed the educational requirements 
for a laboratory technician.' '40 Moreover, a psychologist was convicted of 
perjury for claiming he had a doctorate during the Ted Bundy trialY Other 
cases are listed in the margin. 42 
Professor Starrs has written comprehensively on this topic, noting that 
one firearms expert took some credit for ''the development of penicillin, the 
'Pap' smear, and to top it all off, the atomic bomb.' '·l3 Professor Sales insight­
fuiiy asks: "But if people are willing to lie about something [credentials] on 
which it is so easy to be caught, how common and how damaging to the fact­
finding process are misrepresentations about the substance of forensic sci­
ence: fabrication of findings, exaggeration of findings, withholding of 
exculpatory findings, and other lrnowing attempts to create in the fact finder 
an impression that is not supported by the scientific evidence?' '44 
In a recent case in Cleveland, a thief and forger testified as a questioned 
documents examiner. \J\fhen his background was revealed by a newspaper 
reporter, he was charged and convicted of peljUl)' because he had lied about 
his credentials. When the lawyer who caHed tllis vritness was questioned by 
the press, he reportedly stated: "It's not my job to check out people's 
credentials.' '45 But if it is not the attorney's responsibility, whose is it? 
38 See generally American Academy of Forensic Sciences, By Laws, art. II (code 
of ethics and conduct) (''Every member of the AAFS shall refrain from providing 
any material misrepresentation of education, training, experience or area of 
expertise.''). 
39 Doepel v. United States, 434 A.2d 449, 460 (D.C. App.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 
I037 (198I) . 
. Jo Conm10nwealth v. Mount, 257 A.2d 578, 579 (Pa. 1969). 
·n Kline v. State, 444 So.2d II 02 (Fla. Ct. App. 1984). 
·l2 E.g., Maddox v. Lord, 8I8 F.2d 1058, I 062 (2d Cir. 1987) (serologist testified 
falsely about his academic credentials); People v. Alfano, 420 N.E.2d 1I14, 11I6 
(Ill. App. I983) (arson expert testified falsely about his academic credentials); State 
v. Elder, 433 P.2d 462 ( Kan. I967) (lab technician convicted of perjury for 
misrepresenting his educational background); State v. DeFronzo, 394 N.E.2d I 027, 
I 030 (Ohio C.P. 1978) (lab analyst pleaded guilty to 8 counts of falsification for 
misstating his academic credentials). 
'l3 Starrs, "Mountebanks Among Forensic Scientists," in 2 Forensic Science 
Handbook I, 7, 20-29 (R. Saferstein ed. I988). 
'j4 Sales, "Prevalence and Impact of Ethical Problems in Forensic Science," 34 J. 
Forensic Sci. 772, 789 (1989) (listing other cases). 
45 Ewinger, "Thief, forger key witness for ex-boss of CMHA," Cleveland Plain 
Dealer, Sept. 25, 1999. 
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lack of Valid Experience 
It was once shocking,, but now commonplace, to :find experts who are 
totally unqualified to testify. Some courts seem to follow the old trial 
lawyer's adage: "If the witness comes from out-of-town and carries an at­
tache case, the witness is an expert." For instance, a study of drug testing 
laboratories in the 1970s discovered the following drug "expert," who had 
43 years of experience and more than 2500 court appearances: ''[The expert] 
admitted that not only did he not have a college degree, but that he had never 
even finished high school. He claimed that heroin was an alkaloid, which it 
is, but did not remember what an alkaloid was; He could not draw the 
structure of heroin or benzene, one of the commqnest and simplest organic 
molecules. . . . In addition, he could not explain any single chemical reac­
tion about which he had testified.' '46 
Another example involved neutron activation analysis (NAA). In Ward 
v. State47 the prosecution expert was employed by a city crime laboratory. 
Ail important article on NAA questioned whether this person would have the 
proper qualifications in nuclear physics and analytical chemistry necessary 
to conduct this type of analysis.48 Also, the qualifications necessary to 
conduct NAA differ from the qualifications needed to interpret the results; 
the "qualifications of the expert as an analytical chemist do not necessarily 
establish his competence to interpret the legal relevance of his 
measurements.' '49 
In State v. Barnes50 the testimony of a defense expert concerning a pellet 
dispersion pattern test was excluded because the expert was not qualified. He 
''became a gunsmith after completing a correspondence course. He had 
never received training in forensic science, firearms identification or bal­
listics. He had never testified as an expert in any area. He worked as a sales 
clerk at a hardware store and in his own gun repair business.' '51 
Cases involving questioned documents examiners also illustrate this 
point. In United States v. Bourgeois, 52 the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals up­
held a trial court's exclusion of the testimony of an "expert" who was not a 
member of the American Board of Forensic Document Examiners, who 
practiced graphotherapy in addition to handwriting comparison, and who 
acquired a masters degree in graphoanalysis and a Ph.D. in metaphysics and 
46 Stein, Laessig & Indriksons, "An Evaluation of Drug Testing Procedures Used 
by Forensic Laboratories and the Qualifications of Their Analysts," 1973 Wis. L. 
Rev. 727,728. 
47 427 S.W.2d 876 (Tex. Crim. App. 1968). 
48 Comment, "The Evidentiary Uses of Neutron Activation Analysis," 59 Cal. 
L. Rev. 997, 1036 n.216 (1971). 
49 Id. at 1031. 
50 597 So. 2d 1109 (La. App. 1992). 
51 I d. at 1112. 
52 950 F.2d 980, 986 (5th Cir. 1992). 
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religion by correspondence. Although other cases are in accord,53 there are 
some noteworthy exceptions. Indeed, one dissenting judge stated in 
exasperation: ''If this witness has indeed testified over 3 00 times as an experi 
on discoveling spulious handwliting as she claimed, it is an astonishing 
indictment on the gullibility of lawyers and judges.' '54 
Perhaps the best (worst?) examples involve hypnosis ''expe1is.'' In one 
Wyoming case,55 even the prosecutor had difficult-y stating his expert's 
qualifications. The majority heid that the hypnotist did not need any 
qualifications. The dissent replied: 
It follows, therefore, that a hobo passing through town or a derelict in 
the county jail could hypnotize a potential witness, and the witness' 
testimony would be admissible at trial . . . . There is a man in Oakland, 
California, who is the dean and lone "professor" at "Croaker College." 
For the sum of $150 each, this man trains frogs to jump . . . . As part of 
his rigid training curriculum, the ·"professor" claims that he hypnotizes 
the frog; while they are in their hypnotic trance, he plays an attitude­
improvement tape to them. Under our present standards the dean of 
"Croaker College" would be over-qualified as a hypnotist.56 
In a subsequent case, the majority described a hypnotist as a ''non­
professional with meager training in hypnotic techniques.' '57 From the dis­
sent we learn that the "meager training" was a 32-hour home comse; the 
hypnotist was also a maintenance man at Pacific Power and Light Company. 58 
The janitor? 
53 E.g., State v. Livanos, 725 P.2d 505, 507 (Ariz. App. 1986) (The record re­
vealed that "he had never testified in a superior court in Arizona, that the last time 
he had testified in a superior court was in Indiana in 1969, that he belonged to an or­
ganization called World Association of Document Examiners, . . . whose admis­
sions procedures were very infonnal, but that he was not certified by the American 
Board of Forensic Document Examiners."); Carroll v. State, 634 S.W.2d 99, 102 
(Ark. 1982) ("He had taken a correspondence course from the Intemational Gra­
phoanalysis Society of Chicago, which had certified him. . . . In his twelve years of 
alleged experience 'in questioned document work' he had testified as an expert only 
once, in Clinton, Iowa, and had 'worked with' law enforcement officers in two 
Arkansas counties, but the cases did not come to trial. . . . He was not a member of 
the Academy of Forensic Sciences."); People v. Tidwell, 706 P.2d 438, 439 (Colo. 
App. 1985) (excluding testimony of a graphoanalyst because not certified by Amer­
ican Board of Document Examiners); Gaves v. State, 547 N.E.2d 881, 882 (Ind. 
App. 1989) ("The witness testified she was a graphoanalyst, a graduate of the 
International Graphoanalysis School in Chicago, a member of the International Gra­
phoanalysis Society and the World Association of Document Examiners, and had 
previously testified as an expert on four occasions.''). 
54 Hooten v. State, 492 So. 2d 948, 958 (Miss. 1986) (dissenting opinion). 
55 Gee v. State, 662 P.2d 103 (Wyo. 1983). 
56 Id. at 105-06, 106 n. 3. 
57 Haselhuhn v. State, 727 P.2d 280, 283 (Wyo. 1986), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 
1098 (1987). 
58 Jd. at 289 n. 1. 
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Testifying Beyond Expertise 
One of the most common problems concerns experts who testifY beyond 
their expertise. As Professor Maguire noted a half century ago, "It goes 
without saying that an expert qualified to testifY upon one topic may be 
completely unqualified to testifY about another as to which he lacks special 
knowledge, skill, experience, or training, but some applications of this 
principle take the unwary by surprise.' '59 There is no shortage of examples. 
A series of bite-mark cases illustrate this point. In State v. Garrison60 the 
expert was permitted to state his conclusion in terms of probability theory, 
testifYing that "there is an eight in one million probability that the teeth 
marks found on the deceased's breast were not made by appellant. "61 Such a 
statement appears to be without scientific foundation. The expert did not 
perform any of his own mathematical calculations, was unaware of the 
formula used to arrive at that figure other than that it was "computerized," 
and was ignorant of the statistical weight assigned to each variable used iil 
the equation.62 The dissent commented: ''[W]hile Dr. Campbell may have a 
great deal of expertise in the actual comparison techniques of bite-mark 
identification, he is totally out of his field when the discussion turns to prob­
ability theory. "63 
L'1 Commonwealth v. Henry64 the expert went beyond a compa..rison and 
characterized a bite mark as "sadistic" rather than a "sexual" or "fighting" 
mark. In his view, the "essence of the distinction is that fighting bite marks 
are less well defined because they are done carelessly and quickly, whereas 
attacking and sadistic bite marks are made slowly and produce a clearer 
pattern. ' '65 According to the expert, ''the sadistic bite mark is one of the 
most well defined. Sexual bite marks are also well defined, but usually have 
59 Maguire, Evidence: Common Law and Common Law 30-31 (1947). 
60 585 P.2d 563 (Ariz. 1978). 
61 Id. at 566. 
62 "As indicated in the majority opinion, Dr. Campbell was unsure as to precisely 
where he obtained the figure 'eight in one million.' My independent research reveals 
that of the two treatises which he could name as containing statistical information, 
only . . . [one] lists any figures on the uniqueness of a bite-mark. Rather than the 
eight in one million figure vouched for by Dr. Campell, though, that treatise . . . 
contains the figure eight in one hundred thousand." I d. at 568-69. "Moreover, the 
applicability of even an eight in one hundred thousand figure to the defendant is 
dubious." I d. at 569 n. l .  
63 Id. at 568. See also McCord, ''A Primer For the Nonmathematically Inclined 
on Mathematical Evidence in Criminal Cases: People v. Collins and Beyond," 47 
Wash. & Lee L. Rev. 741, 801 (1990) ("A blistering and convincing dissent [in 
Garrison] showed the probability to be without foundation and thus unfairly 
prejudicial.''). 
64 569 A.2d 929 (Pa. 1990), cert. denied, 499 U.S. 931 (1991). 
65 Id. at 934. 
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a red center, produced by sucking tissue into the mouth.' '66 The testimony 
characterizing the mark as a "sadistic" mark was relevant on the issue of 
whether the homicide was committed by means of torture. It seems doubtful 
that a bite mark can be characterized as ''sexual'' or ''fighting'' by an exam­
ination of the mark alone. Sunounding circumstances, including an autopsy, 
may pennit such a characterization. 
One illustration of an expert testifying beyond his expertise arises with 
technicians. Courts must "differentiate between ability to operate an instru­
ment or perform a test and the ability to make an interpretation drawn from 
use of the instrument' '67 For example, ''an officer may administer a breath 
test even though he is not otherwise q,ualified to interpret the results.' '68 
Similarly, in a case involving the horizontal gaze nystagmus test for 
intoxication, one cou..rt remarked: "[The officer's] opinion that appellant was 
tmder the influence of alcohol, to the extent it was based on the nystagmus 
test, rests on scientific premises well beyond his knowledge, training, or 
education. Without some understanding of the processes by which alcohol 
ingestion produces nystagmus, how strong the correlation is, how other pos­
sible callses might be 1naslced, what margin of etTor has been shovvn in 
statistical surveys, and a host of other relevant factors, [the officer's] opinion 
on causation, noP.vithstanding his ability to recognize the symptom, was 
unfounded.' '69 
A different issue arises when the testifying expert is qualified (perhaps 
eminently so) but the witness did not conduct the actual examination. In 
short, the wrong expert is on the witness stand. For instance, in Reardon v. 
Manson70 a toxicologist testified about the identity of a seized substance 
(marijuana) based on tests perfonned by chemists working under his supervi­
sion. The Second Circuit upheld the practice: ''Expe1i reliance upon the 
output of others does not necessmily violate the confrontation clause where 
the expert is available for questioning concerning the nature and reasonable-
66 Id. 
67 People v. King, 72 CaL Rpt. 478, 491 (CaL App. 1968). 
68 French v. State, 484 S.W.2d 716, 719 (Tex. Crim. App. 1972). Accord State v. 
James, 428 N.E.2d 876, 878 (Ohio App. 1980) (state trooper qualified as an expert 
in the operation of intoxilyzer but did not possess sufficient learning and knowledge 
about effects of alcohol consumption); State v. Priester, 391 S.E.2d 227, 228 ( S.C. 
1990) (lab toxicologist not qualified to testify about the effect of alcohol on the 
brain). 
69 People v. Williams, 5 CaL Rpt. 2d 130, 135 (CaL App. 1992). 
io 806 F.2d 39 (2d Cir. 1986), ceri. denied, 481 U.S. 1020 (1987). 
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ness of his reliance. . . . This is particularly true where the defendants have 
access to the same sources of information through subpoena or otherwise.' '71 
The court, however, passed over a significant problem. In 1983 Sales and 
Duizend published a study on the use of scientific evidence. Part of their 
investigation involved case studies of different forensic techniques. The drug 
case in their study is the Reardon prosecution. They commented: "In this 
case, the laboratory in question had three doctorate-level toxicologists and 
twenty-two or twenty-four less-credentialed chemists. The volume of tests 
performed (about 20,000 annually) left the toxicologist an average of only a 
few minutes per day to attend to any given test. Is this adequate involvement 
to justify testifying to the :findings?"72 In other words, the toxicologist was 
"supervising" fifty cases a day. As the district judge had discerned: "[I]t 
strains credulity to assert that Dr. Reading could personally 'supervise' some 
fifty of these tests daily. "73 
lay Testimony Distinguished 
There is sometimes an overlap between lay and expe1t testimony.74 Both 
lay and expert witnesses, for example, are permitted to state opinions 
concerning handwriting and sanity.75 One court even permitted lay witnesses 
to respond to hypothetical questions. 76 There is, however, an important dif­
ference between t.hese two types of opinions: '' [T]he lay witness is using his 
opinion as a composite expression of his observations otherwise difficult to 
state, whereas the expert is expressing his scientific knowledge through his 
opinions.' '77 The Fifth Circuit put it this way: 
Unlike expert opinion, where the opinion is the product of applying 
special skill in some art, trade, or profession acquired apart from the case, 
lay opinion expresses a conclusion drawn from observations in circum­
stances where it is impractical, if possible at all, to recount the observed 
"factual" components of the opinion. The common illustrations are an 
expression of opinion by a lay observer of a car's speed or a person's 
expression or emotional state (he was furious). Because these opinions 
draw upon the facts in the case itself, they are more easily confronted 
71 ld. at 42. 
72 Sales & Van Duizend, The Use of Scientific Evidence in Litigation 49 (1983). 
73 Reardon v. Manson, 617 F. Supp. 932, 936 (D. Conn. 1985). 
74 Fed. R. Evid. 701: "If the witness is not testifying as an expert, the witness' 
testimony in the form of opinions or inferences is limited to those opinions or infer­
ences which are (a) rationally based on the perception of the witness and (b) helpful 
to a clear understanding of the witness' testimony or the determination of a fact in 
issue. " 
75 The better tenninology is lay and expert "testimony" rather than "witnesses" 
because one witness may be both a "fact " witness and an expert witness. 
76 See United States v. Ranney, 719 F.2d 1183, 1188-89 (1st Cir. 1983) (investors 
permitted to answer a number of hypothetical questions to establish that they would 
not have invested but for the representations made; not being asked as experts). 
77 Ladd, "Expert Testimony," 5 Vand. L. Rev. 414,419 (1952). 
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than are expert opinion, whose source is often extraneous to the case at 
trial. As such, receipt of lay opinion is much less likely to be prejudicial, 
especially where its role is cumulative and is not essential to the suffi­
ciency of the evidence, as here. 78 
In some cases lay witnesses cross the line and testify about matters that 
require expertise.79 In other cases, the line between lay and expert testimony 
becomes blurred. Indeed, the First Circuit has commented: ''No longer is lay 
opinion testimony limited to areas within the common knowledge of 
ordinary persons. Rather, the individual experience and lmowledge of a lay 
witness may establish his or her competence, without qualification as an 
expert, to express an opinion on a particular subject outside the realm of 
common lmowledge.' '80 In contrast, other courts lament this development: 
'' [W]ith each new trial day the government pushed to squeeze as much as 
possible from this 'lay witness.' The result is clear, certainly now, that dur­
ing [the witness's] two-and-half days. on the stand, he wielded his expertise 
as a bank examiner in a way that is incompatible with a lay witness.' '81 
The distinction between lay and expert testimony shoUld be maintained. 
As the Supreme Court noted in Kumho Tires Co. v. Carmichae/,82 the evi­
dentiary rationale underlying Rule 702 is that the Federal Rules grant experts 
special latitude unavailable to other witnesses on the assumption that expert 
testimony has a reliable basis. A proposed· amendment to Federal Rule 701, 
which governs lay opinion testimony, would add language to clarify this 
distinction. 83 
Moreover, the distinction between lay and expert testimony is critical in 
applying other rules. For instance, Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 
16(a)( l )(E) requires pretrial disclosure of a summary of an expert's 
testimony. Classification of the evidence as lay opinion denies the adverse 
party the benefit of this rule. As one court has remarked, the prosecution 
should not ''subvert'' the expert discovery rule by offering expert opinion on 
78 United States v. Carlock, 806 F.2d 535, 552 (5th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 480 
U.S. 949 (1987). 
79 E.g., State v. Flaherty, 605 N.E.2d 1295, 1300 (Ohio App.) ("The average po­
lice officer is not sufficiently versed in psychology to render an opinion that a given 
individual' s reaction to stress is normal or abnormal, especially a person as emotion­
ally complex as appellant appears to be"; testifYing on whether defendant cried the 
moming of the murder), app. dismissed, 596 N.E.2d 469 (Ohio 1992) .. 
80 United States v. Paiva, 892 F.2d 148, 157 (1st Cir. 1989). 
81 United States v. Riddle, 103 F.3d 423, 428 (5th Cir. 1997). 
82 526 U.S. 137 (1999) ("Rules 702 and 703 grant expert witnesses testimonial 
latitude unavailable to other witnesses on the 'assumption that the expert's opinion 
will have a reliable basis . . . . " ' ). 
83 Fed. R. Evid. 701 (1998 proposed amendment adding a third requirement­
"( c) not based on scientific, technical or other specialized knowledge."). The cur­
rent rule can be found in note 74 supra. 
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drug trafficking as lay opinion testimony.84 In addition, Federal Rule 704(b) 
prohibits testimony on ultimate �ssues concerning an accused's mental condi­
tion in criminal cases; this provision does not apply to lay witnesses. 
Conclusion 
The issues examined in this article are not new. Over a century ago, the 
Minnesota Supreme Court observed that "[t]here is hardly anything, not 
palpably absurd on its face, that cannot now be proved by some so-called 
'experts." '85 More recently, a federal judge stated that "experts whose 
opinions are available to the highest bidder have no place testifying in a 
court of law'' and it ''is time to take hold of expert testimony in federal 
trials.' '86 
84 United States v. Figueroa-Lopez, 125 F.3d 1241, 1246 (9th Cir. 1997), cert. 
denied, 523 U.S. 1131 (1998). 
85 Keegan v. Minneapolis & St. Louis R.R. Co., 78 N.W. 965, 966 (Minn.1899). 
86 In re Air Crash Disaster at New Orleans, 795 F.2d 1230, 1234 (5th Cir. 1986). 
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